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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and 
BERNICE B. CASTAGNO, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MELVIN CHURCH and ESTHER 
C. CHURCH, his wife, 
CASE NO. 14412 
Defendants-Appellants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Albert J0 Castagno and Bernice B0 Castagno 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-respondents 
for Breach of Contract by defendants-appellants under pro-
visions of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the lower court 
asking for specific performance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract or in the alternative for money damages• The 
issues were tried to the Court setting without a jury* 
The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment requiring the defendants to specifically perform 
the provisions of the Contract with respect to conveyance of 
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the real property; relieved defendants' of their obligation 
to convey one second foot of water and awarded plaintiffs 
a $12,000,00 abatement of the contract price for failure 
to furnish the one second foot of water. 
From this Judgment defendants appeal, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek affirmance of the judg-
ment of the trial court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For clarity, the plaintiffs-respondents will be 
referred to as buyers and defendants-appellants will be 
referred to as sellers. 
Seller Melvin Church by profession is a well driller. 
Sellers were owners of 40 acres of land upon which Sellers 
had drilled a well for water planning to later transfer 
to the well through approval of an application for a change 
of point of diversion a water right Seller had obtained 
in another water district known as the Buzianis right* 
Sellers and Buyers duly entered into an Earnest Money 
Agreement for sale to the Buyers of the 40 acres of land 
together with one second foot of water; the well already 
drilled upon the land, and a pump adequate to pump one 
second foot of water. 
Seller Melvin Church made application to the State 
Engineers' office requesting a change of point of diversion 
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of the Buzianis water right to the diversion point of the 
well drilled upon the 40 acres. The application was denied. 
Discussion with the State Engineers1 Office revealed 
the possibility of another source of water, the point of 
diversion of which might be successfully diverted to the 
location point of the well on the subject 40 acres. 
Assignments of the other water right (known as the 
Barnard Castagno (deceased) right) was effected. 
The Sellers and Buyers executed a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on December 14, 1973, incorporating therein the 
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement previously entered 
into. 
Pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract Buyers 
were to pay Sellers $32,000.00 as a total purchase price, 
at 87o interest per annum, of which $16,000.00 was paid 
as a cash down payment and the remaining balance was to 
be paid at $2,500.00 per year beginning December 15, 1974, 
and a like sum annually thereafter until the purchase price 
was paid in full. 
For that consideration Sellers were to convey to 
Buyers forty (40) acres of land, one second foot of water, 
a well certificate # and an electric pump sufficient 
to pump one second foot of water. 
Twenty (20) acres of land was to be deeded to Buyers 
upon down payment, which was done, the next contiguous 
ten (10) acres was to be deeded upon payment of the next 
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$8,000o00 and the final ten (10) acres was to be deeded 
upon payment in full of the contract,. 
Buyers were to take possession of the property on 
the 1st day of January, 1974, and have exclusive use of 
the said well and electric pump and two second feet of 
water from said well during the period of the contract• 
Sellers further agreed to drill an additional six 
(6) inch well on the premises for the sum of $500.00 which 
was done. 
The Buyers took possession, planted crops in the 
Spring of 1973, purchased a sprinkling system and attempted 
to use water from the well on the property pursuant to the 
terms of the contract, but were prevented from the use 
thereof by the Utah State Engineers1 Office, Water Rights 
Division. 
The 1974 planting season passed and Buyers still 
were without the use of the water. Buyers paid the annual 
$2,500.00 payment due December 1, 19740 Buyers then conveyed 
a portion of the twenty (20) acres of land deeded from 
Sellers to their daughter who constructed a new house on 
the premises. With the approach of the 1975 planting season, 
Buyers were still without the use of the water and on March 
13, 1975, tendered to Sellers full payment on the balance 
of the purchase price. Sellers did not convey the remaining 
twenty acres of land nor the one second foot of water, and 
on the 14th day of May, 1975, Buyers filed suit in the 
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District Court. 
The rule of law is so well fixed that authorities 
need not be cited for the proposition that on appeal the 
facts and the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party below0 In this respect, 
it should be noted that the sellers do not, in their brief 
on appeal, specifically take issue or object to any Find-
ings of Fact made and entered by the Court below, nor do 
the sellers claim that any finding is unsupported by evidence« 
It is suggested therefore, that the appellate court rely 
on the facts as they were found by the District Court0 
Even though the sellers, in their Statement of Facts, 
restate certain minor portions of the evidence and choose 
to disregard the uncontroverted Findings of Fact made and 
entered by the Court, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
are as follows: 
"la That the plaintiffs (buyers) have performed 
fully the terms of the Contract at issue on their part, 
20 That defendants (sellers) have failed to perform 
that portion of the Contract in which they agreed to pro-
vide one second foot of water and the Court finds that 
the defendants were unable at the time of trial to perform0 
3o The Court finds that the real property described 
in the Contract is of the value of $l,500o00 per acre, pro-
vided one second foot of water is available. That the 
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reasonable value of the property without one second foot 
of water provided is $500*00 per acre and therefore plain-
tiffs should be awarded specific performance of the Contract 
and rebate of the terms of the Contract in the amount of 
$12,000o00o" (Findings of Fact p. 1,2) 
The buyers1 full performance referred to in the Find-
ings of Fact was the tendering of all monies due and owing 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, (Tra 16 & 110). 
The sellers1 breach was their failure to convey the remaining 
twenty acres to the buyers and their failure to provide 
one second foot of water pursuant to the terms of the Contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
Sellers attempt in their Brief on Appeal to undermine 
the clear and exact provisions of the contract concerning 
the water right to be conveyed to the buyers. However, the 
Contract between the parties is explicit concerning the 
water rights to be conveyedo The relevant provisions thereof 
setting forth the sellers1 obligation to transfer a water 
right to the buyers are as follows: 
"Together with electric pump and all water rights 
including one second foot of water in and to well 
certificate # . Said pump sufficient to pump 
one second foot of water,'1 (Ex. 1-P Contract, P.l) 
"Upon payment in full of said contract price, 
sellers will convey by warranty deed the final 
easterly contiguous Ten (10) acres of said pro-
perty, together with all water right to Well 
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already drilled upon said property Certificate 
# including Two (2) second feet of water, 
one second foot of which Buyer will furnish. 
Seller to Deed therewith an electric pump for 
said Well. Sellers guarrantee said Pump and Well 
Certificate # for one (1) year after date 
hereof. Said electric pump sufficient to pump 
one second foot of water. 
Sellers further agree that Buyers shall have ex-
clusive use of said Well and electric pump and 
2 second feet of water from said Well until and 
during the period of said Contract until paid in 
full a11 (Exol-P Contract, P. 3) 
That these and the remaining provisions of the Contract 
were clear and unambiguous, that Sellers and Buyers clearly 
understood the obligations of each in performance thereof 
is clear from the testimony of each at the trial. Buyer, 
Albert Castagno, testified he was familiar with the terms 
of the Contract, (Tr0 P6 line 3-21), that both parties read 
the Contract, made corrections therein and initialed the 
same. (Tr. P6 Line 22-30, P7 Line 1-3)0 
That the down payment was made and Sellers delivered 
to Buyers an executed Warranty Deed for Twenty Acres of 
the property. (Tr. P7 Line 4-16)„ 
At the trial, Seller, Melvin Church testified that 
it was his intention at the time the Contract was executed 
to abide by its terms in obtaining one second foot of water 
and conveying that right to the buyers. (Tr. 87). He also 
testified that he had obtained the one second foot of water 
to convey to the buyers but was not ready to convey it to 
them. (Tre 88). 
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Melvin Church's understanding and intention to sell 
the land with one second foot of water thereon was also 
clear from his testimony as to his attempts to obtain or 
transfer water rights to said property subsequent to the 
execution of the original Earnest Money Agreement entered 
into between the parties in 19720 (Tra 83). 
This Court has stated in Hardings Co0 v0 Eimco Corp0> 
1 Uto 2d 320, 323; 226 P,2d 494 (1954), that ". . . in the 
interpretation of contracts, the interpretation given by 
the parties themselves as shown by their acts will be adopt-
ed by the Courto" 
Melvin Churchfs original attempt to transfer water 
to the subject property was a right he had previously acquired, 
known as the "Buzianis" righto This attempt was prevented 
by the State Engineers1 Office when it would not allow the 
requested change from one water district to another,(Tr0 
39-40)o Melvin Church thereafter attempted to have another 
water right, known as the "Bernard Castagno" right transferred 
to the subject property,, The buyers did not oppose Churchs f 
attempts to procure or transfer these other water rights 
to the subject property. The parties had already entered 
an earnest money agreement: for the sale of the land including 
one second foot of water, and the sellers1 failure to obtain 
the water would also be detrimental to the buyers1 interest 
in the property0 In fact, the buyers took affirmative steps 
to help sellers procure the water the sellers were obligated 
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to provide. (Tr0 56-57). Even though all subsequent attempts 
by Melvin Church to transfer water rights to the subject 
property were prevented by the State Engineer, the sellers1 
obligation under the Contract to supply one second foot 
of water was always clear and the buyers1 attempts to help 
the defendants perform by obtaining other rights never 
relieved the sellers of their obligation to supply the 
one second foot of water. It was never asserted by sellers 
at trial nor should the assertions now be entertained that 
the terms of the Contract were so ambiguous that the sellers 
did not intend or know of their obligation to furnish one 
second foot of water• 
The testimony of seller, Melvin Church, as to his 
intent to furnish the one second foot of water and his 
testimony as to his conduct in attempting to furnish it 
completely refute that the Contract terms relative to the 
sellers furnishing one second foot of water were ambiguous. 
Appellants (sellers) in their brief allege that the 
Contract between the parties was ambiguous since there is 
a blank after "well certificate # ", in the Contracts' 
provisions and assert it was the understanding of the buyers 
at the time the contract was executed that the term "well 
certificate # " meant a specific water right already 
existing upon the property0 
Prior to the time the buyers took possession of the 
first twenty acres of the subject property, there was a 
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well and pump already installed thereon by Melvin Church9 
(Tr# 20)o Both sellers and buyers were knowledgeable of 
this fact at the time of execution of the Contract and 
knew no identifying number had been assigned by the State 
Engineerfs Office to that well. The meaning of "well 
certificate # " was clearly and adequately under-
stood and explained by buyer, Albert Castagno, at the 
trial when he testified on cross-examination as follows: 
"QUESTION: I note on the contract, Mr* Castagno, 
that the contract and the exhibit refer to a certain 
number and that there is then a line and itfs 
blank; can you tell to what that referred? 
ANSWER: Referred to the well permito 
QUESTION: I see* And by that you mean a 
permit from the State Engineer for the use of 
water? 
ANSWER: For the drilling of the well* It 
was the well number, 
QUESTION: In other words, you are referring 
to merely the permit to drill the well, not to 
the water right itself? 
ANSWER: True. That is the number -- should 
be the number permit to drill the well, but we 
don't know for sure what the number is, 
QUESTION: I see. Are you now aware as to 
what the number is? 
ANSWER: We have a number but we're not sure 
itfs the proper one,11 (Tr0 20, Lines 5-21) 0 
The plain meaning of the words "well certificate 
# ff is self evident and the explanation as to its 
meaning given by the Buyer, Albert Castagno, at the time 
of the trial was uncontrovertedo Therefore, appellants 
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argument that "well certificate # " meant a specific 
water right in the mind of the buyer at time of execution 
of the Contract thereby making the contract ambiguous 
is specious and not consistent with the testimony at the 
trial. That testimony clearly indicated that in the minds 
of the sellers and buyers and in actuality there were never 
any water rights existing upon the subject property at 
the time the Contract was entered into. In fact, appellants1 
attorney acknowledged this fact at the trial when he stated 
the following, concerning the Contract. (Tr* 24). 
"Mr. JEPPESEN: It (the Contract) provides 
that the well is sufficient to pump at least 
one second foot and the pump will pump one 
second foot, and that Mr. Church was selling 
all water rights including one second foot 
of water in it to the well; certainly applicable 
to that particular well and I submit, Your 
Honor, that at the time the contract was ex-
ecuted, the parties knew that there was in 
fact no water rights pertinent or assigned," 
(Emphasis added) 
The only thing that existed upon the property when the 
Contract was executed was a well unidentified by number, 
drilled by the sellers, as was reflected in the Contract. 
The Contract provisions were unambiguous to the 
trial court which had the prerogative to interpret the 
provisions in light of the evidence and should be sustained 
therein. 
In Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 17 
Ut.2d 32, 36; 404 P.2d 30 (1965), this Court said, "More 
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over, when there is such uncertainty in the language of 
a contract, it is the prerogative of the trial court to 
determine the proper interpretation in the light of the 
evidence". 
In the present case, the trial court rendered 
its own interpretation which is the only plausible explana-
tion of the clause at issue when it said: 
THE COURT: ", .; . the way I read Paragraph 
3 of the agreement that there is to be a 
well that was adequate or would allow the 
use of two second feet; and one of those 
second feet Mr. Church (seller) was respon-
sible for and if it took some further develop-
ment and pumping to take care of an additional 
second foot that would be the responsibility 
of the buyer/1 (Tr. 23-24). 
The buyers did not care where the sellers obtained 
the water right to put in the well already drilled upon 
the subject property their only concern was that the property 
they had contracted for would have available the one second 
foot of water bargained for, 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO LOOK 
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE CONTRACT 
SINCE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS CLEAR 
ON THE FACE OF THE CONTRACT, THE DOCTRINE 
OF FRUSTRATION CAN BE SHOWN BY EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE AND THE COURT IN FACT PERMITTED 
ALL TESTIMONY OFFERED BY APPELLANTS TO SHOW 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING WATER 
RIGHTS AND FRUSTRATION OF PERFORMANCE 
It is clear that sellers, among other things, 
intended to convey forty acres of land and one second foot 
of water to the buyers pursuant to the terms of the Contract0 
Appellants now contend the trial court erred in refusing 
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to hear testimony concerning the identity of the water 
rights the sellers intended to supply. 
This argument is simply not supported by the 
record. The Court, early in the trial proceedings, sus-
taining plaintiffs1 objection based upon the parol evidence 
rule, refused to hear testimony concerning discussions 
between the parties about the source of the water right 
to be acquired. 
Counsel for sellers, in their brief, argue it 
was necessary to show the intention of the parties relative 
to the source of the water right to be furnished and to 
have been provided. To do so would have shown sellers 
frustration and impossibility to perform in supplying the 
one second foot of water. The Court indicated in sustain-
ing plaintiffs1 (buyers1) objection that "That's another 
matter, isnft it, Mr. Jeppesen, as to whether or not there 
has been any rights actually acquired." (Tr. 24 Line 14-
16) 
The Court clearly was not preventing sellers, 
by sustaining the objection, from showing frustration and 
impossibility to perform. Counsel for appellants was direct-
ing his remarks to other matters which were correctly object-
ed to and properly sustained by the Court on the basis 
of parol evidence. Counsel for appellant stated, "This 
contract was only one document of a continuing business 
agreement between the parties to develope water and land 
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in Grantsville,o . /'(Tr. 25, Lines 9-14). The Court replied, 
11
. . obut at this state of the proceeding 
I am not convinced that we should go beyond 
the borders of this agreement. As the evidence 
may develop later that may be and you may renew 
that request, Mr. Jeppesen,, Itfs denied at 
this time. (Tr. 25, Lines 17-21). 
Later in the proceedings the Court did allow 
testimony concerning the identity of water rights in exis-
tence at the time the Contract was entered into and testi-
mony concerning the sellers1 efforts to obtain other iden-
tified water rights for the subject property. 
The court in permitting this testimony stated 
the following: 
THE COURT: ". . .what the Court would permit 
you to do, if you so desire, is to offer any 
testimony that there might be as to whether 
there was in fact in existence any water right 
at the time this Contract was entered into." 
(Tr. 44). 
THE COURT: ". . .1 would permit some parol 
testimony here if it can be viewed as such 
as to what the intention of the parties were 
concerning this furnishing of a one second 
foot of water. It appears on the face of this 
agreement that there was to be a second foot 
of water furnished by the defendant. Now, 
if he represented that he had a second foot 
that he could furnish that's one thing; and 
if he represented he had no rights when he 
was going to get: them that's something else." 
(Tr. 45). 
Pursuant to the Court's direction testimony was 
received concerning the identity of the water rights. Mr* 
Rex Larsen, an employee of the State Engineers' Office, 
testified about the sellers early attempts to get the 
"Buzianis right" transferred to the subject property.(Tr. 48). 
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After that attempt had failed Rex Larsen outlined the steps 
the sellers took to get the "Bernard Castagno right11 assign-
ed to them and transferred to the subject property. (Tr. 
50). 
Melvin Church himself was allowed to specify those 
certain water rights he attempted to obtain to perform 
his part of the Contract(Tr. 90-91). The sellers were 
afforded ample opportunities during the trial to identify 
the water rights they intended to supply the subject property. 
The court did not err in refusing to look beyond 
the four corners of the contract since the intent of the 
parties was clear on the face of the contract, the doctrine 
of frustration can be shown by extrinsic evidence, and the 
court in fact permitted all testimony offered by appellants 
to show the intent of the parties regarding water rights 
and frustration of performance. Thus it is clear that 
appellants1 contention that the court did not afford them 
the opportunity by sustaining the buyers* objection, to 
identify the water rights and thereby show frustration 
and impossibility to perform by supplying the one second 
foot of water is totally without merit. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCUSED THE SELLERS FROM 
SUPPLYING THE WATER UNDER THE CONTRACT AND 
PROPERLY ABATED THE CONTRACT PRICE FOR SUCH 
FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE. 
Appellants in their brief on appeal have overlooked 
the succint finding of the trial court that "the defendants 
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were unable at the time of the trial to perform" with respect 
to the one second foot of water to be conveyed to the buyers0 
(Findings of Fact Tr0, 142, Lines 6-11). Appellants have 
set forth tedious accounts from the record concerning their 
inability to so perform under the Contract. This however 
was specifically acknowledged by the trial court in its 
findings. 
Appellants argue that their inability to convey 
the one second foot of water under the Contract invoked 
the equitable doctrine of frustration to excuse their perfor-
mance. However appellants have also overlooked the fact 
that the trial court did specifically excuse them from 
conveying the one second foot of water to the buyers. The 
sellers were not required by the court to specifically perform 
this provision of the Contract since they were unable 
to do sOo In fact the trial court actually applied the 
relief the appellants have suggested on appeal. The sellers 
were not required to acquire for the benefit of the buyers 
or convey one second foot of water to the buyers and the 
sellers were not required to pay for the water they had 
previously bargained for but could not be supplied. The 
Court therefore made the following uncontroverted findings 
of fact and conclusion: 
". o othe Court now finds that the plaintiffs 
have at all times performed under the terms 
of the contract; that the defendants have 
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failed to perform that portion of the contract 
that provides for their furnishing one second 
foot of water for the use of plaintiffs during 
the term of the contract, and is now unable 
to perform further by a conveyance of such 
a water right and that the subject real property 
has a vlaue of $1,500 per acre if one second 
foot of water is available to irrigate the 
same. 
And that the reasonable value of one 
second foot of water that the defendant fail-
ed to furnish and provide is $12,000." 
"• o .and based upon those findings 
the Court concludes that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to specific performance of the contract 
as it applies to the real estate portion 
thereof; but since the defendants are unable 
to perform that portion of the contract per-
taining to the use and conveyance of one 
second foot of water, an abatement of $12,000 
of the purchase price of the contract is made.11 
The specific performance ordered by the Court was 
the conveyance of the remaining parcel of real property 
provided by the Contract and did not deal with the water 
rights. Buyers did receive an abatement on the Contract 
price for the value of the water unable to be furnished 
by Sellers. 
Hence the Court's decision was the most equitable 
result that could have been possibly fashioned under the 
circumstances. The buyers had entered upon the property, 
made improvements and conveyed a portion of it to their 
daughter, and a total recission of the Contract would have 
been extremely egregious and unwarranted under the facts. 
The sellers were compelled to perform what they 
could under the Contract by conveying the remaining parcel 
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of land, but were further relieved of their obligation 
to convey the one second foot of water„ 
This remedy is characterized as specific performance 
with an abatement of the purchase price for the term not 
performed and is outlined in 71 Am Jur 2d, Specific Per-
formance, §129 as follows: 
"In actions by a vendee for specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of 
real estate, where it appears that the vendor 
is unable to make a complete or perfect title, 
or that there is a deficiency in the quantity 
of land contracted to be sold, the general 
rule is that the vendee, if he so elects, 
is not only entitled to have the contract 
specifically performed to the extent of the 
-endorfs ability to comply therewith by requir-
ing him to give the best title he can or convey 
hat he has, but he may compel the vendor to 
convey his defective title or deficient estate, 
and at the same time have a just abatement 
out of the purchase price for the deficiency 
f title, quantity, or quality of the estate 
to compensate for the vendor's failure to 
perform the contract in full*" 
The court in the instant case required the sellers 
to onvey to the buyers the deficient estate. That is the 
balanc e of the land without the water * The buyers were 
awarded an abatement of the purchase price for the deficiency 
of the quality of the estate, that is the failure of the 
sellers to furnish the one second foot of water, the Court 
thereby abated the contract price in the sum of $12,000.00 
compensating the buyers for the sellers failure to perform 
the contract in fullo 
CONCLUSION 
The Contract entered into by the parties was clear 
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and unambiguous, with respect to the water rights to be 
conveyed thereunder, and the Court did not err in refusing 
to look beyond the four corners of the contract since the 
intent of the parties was clear on the face of the contract, 
the doctrine of frustration can be shown by extrinsic 
evidence, and the court in fact permitted all testimony 
offered by appellants to show the intent of the parties 
regarding water rights and frustration of performance* 
Whereupon the Court found the sellers unable to convey 
the one second foot of water and further relieved them 
of their responsibility to do so and abated the purchase 
price accordingly. Appellants have never argued that the 
land should not have been conveyed under the Contract, 
therefore the remedy effected by the Court was the only 
just and equitable solution to all parties. 
It should be noticed that appellants' counsel in 
their argument has utilized testimony that was ordered 
stricken from the record by the trial court which use is 
certainly not in the best professional taste* 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 19760 
J&*u/Z Qfetzii^ 
EDWARD A. WATSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
Tooele County Courthouse 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
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